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categorization of  fellow group members (Gon-
salkorale & Williams, 2007; Smith & Williams, 
2004; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Zadro, 
Williams, & Richardson, 2004), and even when 
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Ostracism is any behavior in which a group or 
individual excludes and ignores another group or 
individual. Research has now amassed considera-
ble insight into how individuals respond to ostra-
cism and related aversive interpersonal behaviors 
of  social exclusion and rejection. One of  the 
more provocative findings in this type of  research 
is that the immediate responses to ostracism are 
distressful regardless of  mitigating circumstances. 
Research has now shown that people are hurt 
by ostracism regardless of  the disposition of  
the person who is ostracized (Zadro, Boland, 
& Richardson, 2006), regardless of  the social 
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they are financially compensated (Van Beest & 
Williams, 2006). To extend this type of  research 
we draw attention to the underlying assumption 
that responses to ostracism have an adaptive 
value. Humans are social to the core. Others 
provide nurturance, security, mating opportuni-
ties, and reciprocity. Put differently, without 
others we would simply not survive (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995; Gruter & Masters, 1986; Kerr & 
Levine, 2008; Leary, 2001; MacDonald & Leary, 
2005; Williams, 2009).
We argue that the failure to mitigate how peo-
ple experience ostracism may in part be attributed 
to the fact that previous research used cross- 
cutting variables that are not directly related to 
survival and therefore require more cognitive 
processing to properly appraise whether one is 
ostracized from a positive or a negative situation. 
To test this assumption we assessed how individu-
als would respond if  they were ostracized from a 
situation that we assumed is more related to sur-
vival than, for example, the social categorization 
of  fellow group members or whether one is finan-
cially compensated. We tested how people would 
respond when ostracized from a simulated game 
of  Russian roulette. Would such a setting finally 
reduce the immediate distress of  ostracism? 
A temporal model of  responses to ostracism
The theoretical backbone of  our reasoning is pro-
vided by a recent model of  ostracism arguing that 
reactions to ostracism follow three temporal stages: 
reflexive, reflective, and resignation (Williams, 2009). 
Reflexive reactions describe how people experi-
ence ostracism. This term is used to describe that 
immediate reactions to ostracism occur without 
much deliberate thinking and without taking mit-
igating factors into account. In accordance with 
error-management theory (Buss, 1991; Haselton 
& Buss, 2000), the reflexive system “detects first, 
and asks questions later” as if  guided by an evo-
lutionary principle of  “better safe than sorry”.  
Evidence that the immediate response to ostra-
cism is powerful, biased towards over-detecting 
and fast is provided by many experiments. First, 
underscoring that ostracism is quite powerful, 
large effect sizes emerge from a virtual ball toss 
game—Cyberball (Williams & Jarvis, 2006; 
Williams et al., 2000)—in which participants 
neither know, see, nor expect to meet their co-
players. Simply not getting the ball in a 3-min 
game of  Cyberball is sufficient to cause increased 
self-reported levels of  sadness and anger, and 
lower self-reported levels of  belonging, self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence. 
Second, stressing that such immediate responses 
are biased towards over-detecting and consequently 
relatively impervious to cross-cutting variables that 
ought to relieve the experience of  ostracism, a host 
of  experiments have now failed to mitigate the 
immediate experience of  ostracism. Indeed, as we 
already mentioned above, immediate reactions to 
ostracism are no less painful when individuals are 
ostracized by outgroup members than by ingroup 
members (Smith & Williams, 2004; Williams et al., 
2000); even when those outgroup members are 
despised (i.e., the KKK—Gonsalkorale & Williams, 
2007). Similarly, we experience immediate distress 
when ostracized by humans, but no less distress 
than when we are ostracized by a computer (Zadro 
et al., 2004). Even when ostracism benefits the 
individual financially, and inclusion is financially 
costly, ostracism is just as distressing (Van Beest & 
Williams, 2006). 
In fact, numerous studies on humans and other 
social animals have now shown that social pain––
the pain experienced upon social injury when social 
relationships are threatened––and physical pain––
the pain experienced upon bodily injury––overlap 
in their neural circuitry and computational pro-
cesses providing a mechanism why immediate reac-
tions are fast and biased towards over-detecting 
(for reviews of  this neurological evidence see 
Eissenberger & Lieberman, 2004). For example, 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams (2003) used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
examine brain activity of  ostracized Cyberball play-
ers. They found an increase in activation in the 
same region of  the brain (the dorsal anterior cingu-
lated cortex, dACC) that is also activated when indi-
viduals experience physical pain. Moreover, lending 
support that self-reports that are directly assessed 
after the ostracism episode are a good proxy of  
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how people feel during the ostracism episode, 
dACC activation levels were positively correlated 
with the self-report of  fundamental need satisfac-
tion and mood (r = .88). Taken together, these find-
ings strongly support the position that detection of  
ostracism is quick and crude, erring in favor of  
detection when higher cognitive appraisal would 
indicate no danger—and in the case of  Van Beest 
and Williams (2006), even a benefit—exists.
Once the individual is able to reflect upon the 
situational constraints of  the ostracism episode, 
they enter the reflective stage. This stage describes 
coping and goal directed behaviors of  individuals 
that are ostracized. On this stage individuals have 
formed a more thorough appraisal of  the situa-
tion. Consequently, such reflective responses 
need not be uniformly negative and should be 
affected by cross-cutting variables that mitigate 
the appraisal of  the ostracism episode (Chow, 
Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; Oaten, Williams, Jones, 
& Zadro, 2008; Van Beest & Williams, 2006; 
Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006). For example, 
Chow, Tiedens, and Govan (2008) manipulated 
the reason why participants were not selected to 
participate in a game of  Dodge ball. Results 
showed that participants were more likely to 
retaliate when given an unfair reason than a fair 
reason for not being selected. Moreover, Warburton 
et al. (2006) manipulated the possibility to control 
an irritating sound and observed that ostracized 
participants from Cyberball were only aggressive 
towards unrelated others when they could not 
control the unset of  this irritating sound. To give 
a final example, Van Beest and Williams (2006) 
showed whereas immediate reactions of  ostra-
cized people were not affected by the financial 
consequences of  being ostracized, their delayed 
reactions were responsive to the financial out-
come. On the reflexive level ostracized people 
reported lower levels of  belonging, control, self-
esteem, and meaningful existence regardless of  
financial incentives. On the reflective levels they 
were less likely to retaliate when it was financially 
beneficial to them being ostracized than when it 
was financially costly.
Finally, in the resignation stage, individuals who 
are subjected to long-term or frequent acts of  
ostracism are hypothesized to show depletion of  
all coping mechanisms, resulting in helplessness, 
feelings of  worthlessness, alienation, and depres-
sion (Williams & Zadro, 2005). Support for this 
stage comes primarily from qualitative interviews 
with long-term ostracism targets. When asked 
why she did not leave her husband after he had 
given her the silent treatment for 40 years, the 
woman said, “I didn’t think anyone else would 
want me; at least I had a roof  over my head” 
(Williams, 2001).
The present research
In the current studies we focus on the reflexive 
and reflective stages. We argue that previous 
research has tested the power of  ostracism by 
using cross-cutting variables that are only indi-
rectly linked to survival and argue that this might 
be the reason why this research has failed to miti-
gate the immediate experience of  ostracism. To 
find boundary conditions, we propose, cross- 
cutting variables should have a more direct link to 
survival than those that require a more elaborate 
cognitive appraisal and evaluation. We therefore 
decided to confront participants with the most 
direct threat of  survival that we could think of: 
death. What if  individuals are ostracized from a 
situation in which they could die?
Of  course, our participants were never in any 
real danger of  dying during our studies. Instead, 
we devised a bomb tossing variant (i.e., Cyber-
bomb) of  Cyberball in which we merely displaced 
the ball with a bomb (see Figure 1 for a snapshot 
of  the graphical presentation of  both games). 
However, it is important to realize that the imme-
diate reaction to such a symbolic death game 
should operate as quick and crude as we assume 
reactions to ostracism are. For example, research 
on terror management has repeatedly shown that 
rather subtle reminders of  death act quickly, espe-
cially when encountered surreptitiously (Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Moreover, recent 
research comparing symbolic and physical extinc-
tion threats showed that both induce angst 
and the desire to strengthen one’s own group, 
suggesting that responses to a symbolic survival 
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threat may illicit similar responses as actual threats 
(Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010). Finally, 
fMRI research has shown that imagining physical 
injury is painful, again suggesting that symbolic 
threats may operate in similar ways as actual 
threats (Ogino et al., 2007). In sum, although our 
participants were never in any real danger, we 
propose that our symbolic survival threat sends a 
powerful message that requires not much cogni-
tive processing to infer that it is actually a good 
thing to be ostracized from Cyberbomb. Conse-
quently, we may observe that people find it less 
distressing to be ostracized from Cyberbomb 
than from Cyberball. 
Study 1: Fundamental needs and 
mood in Cyberbomb
As discussed, previous research finds that situa-
tional manipulations that, logically speaking, 
ought to either increase or decrease the impact of  
ostracism are not sufficient to moderate how 
people experience ostracism. However, if  the 
situational manipulation involves detection of  
another source of  survival threat, then modera-
tion should occur of  such immediate reflexive 
reactions. By manipulating the type of  game from 
which people are ostracized (ball-toss vs. bomb-
toss), we now expected to find moderation in the 
reflexive stage. In Cyberball we expected to repli-
cate the findings that have consistently been doc-
umented with this and other paradigms: 
individuals should be distressed when ostracized. 
In Cyberbomb we had different expectations. 
Although we did anticipate that reactions to 
ostracism would still be negative (because it still 
implies exclusion from a social event) we expected 
that these reactions would be less negative than 
when compared to ostracism in Cyberball because 
being included in an online bomb game ought to 
trigger threat detection, and being ostracized 
would provide an escape from such a threat. Cast 
in terms of  our dependent variables, we expected 
that people would be less satisfied in terms of  
fundamental needs and mood when ostracized 
from Cyberball than when ostracized from 
Cyberbomb.
Method
Participants and design Participants were 87 
students from Leiden University (14 men, 73 
women; Mean age = 20.80, SD = 2.15) and ran-
domly assigned to a 2 (Game type: Cyberball, 
Cyberbomb) × 2 (Game experience: Ostracized, 
Included) between-S design. They were paid 5 
euros for their participation.
Procedure The general outline of  the procedure 
was based on previous research on Cyberball (e.g., 
Van Beest & Williams, 2006). Participants were 
seated behind a computer in separate cubicles. All 
instructions were presented on the computer 
screen. The participants were told that they were 
participating in a study about the relation between 
mental visualization and task performance and 
informed that mental visualization could be best 
exercised through a virtual toss game between three 
players. We told participants that they were playing 
with two other participants and ensured that par-
ticipants were not aware that these other partici-
pants were actually programmed computer players. 
Game type was manipulated by changing the 
object that participants would be tossing (see 
Figure 1). In the ball condition they merely 
threw a ball around, as in previous Cyberball 
experiments. In the Cyberbomb condition, 
however, participants were informed that they 
would be tossing a bomb (depicted as an old 
fashioned round cannonball type bomb with a 
lit fuse) that could explode at any moment. It 
was made clear that the person holding the 
bomb would then die. In both conditions we 
programmed the game so that it would not stop 
when the participants were holding the bomb 
or ball. Moreover, we programmed the Cyber-
bomb game so that the bomb did not explode 
during the game. This ensured that participants 
experienced survival threat during the entire 
game (see also Van Beest & Williams, 2006 for 
a similar procedure with money).
Game experience was manipulated by the use 
of  programmed computer players in a 30-toss 
game. In the inclusion conditions these computer 
players were programmed to throw the ball 10 
times to the participant (i.e., 33% of  the total 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations (within 
brackets) of  reflexive responses by game type (bomb, 
ball) and game experience (ostracism, inclusion) in 
Study 1
Bomb Ball
Ostracism Inclusion Ostracism Inclusion
Needs 3.41 (.67) 5.02 (.78) 2.37 (.64) 4.71 (3.41)
Mood 4.30 (1.09) 5.14 (.84) 3.31 (1.16) 5.18 (4.30)
Note: Assessment of  needs and mood were made on
seven-point scales.
throws). In the ostracized conditions the compu-
ter players were programmed to throw the bomb/
ball twice at the beginning of  the game to the par-
ticipant, and then only to each other for the 
remainder of  the game.
Next, participants filled out a need satisfac-
tion index and mood index that was adapted 
from Van Beest & Williams (2006). This need 
satisfaction index assessed the extent to which 
belonging (e.g., during the game I felt alone), 
control (e.g., during the game I felt in control), 
self-esteem (e.g., during the game I felt inse-
cure), and meaningful existence (e.g., during the 
game I felt that my presence was meaningful) 
are satisfied (α = .95). In addition we also 
assessed a series of  mood items (anger, hurt, 
sadness, happy, elated, cheerful, α = .89). 
Responses to all these questions were recorded 
on a 7-point scale anchored on the ends with 
the terms (1) strongly disagree and (7) strongly 
agree. Moreover, we reverse coded the negative 
questions. To interpret the analyses of  these 
measures one should thus keep in mind that a 
high number is associated with need fulfillment 
and more positive affect whereas a low number 
is associated with need threat and more nega-
tive affect.
To check the game type manipulation we 
asked participant whether it was dangerous to 
play the tossing game (1 = not at all danger-
ous), 7 = very dangerous). To check the game 
experience manipulation we asked participants 
to recall the percentage of  ball/bomb throws 
that were thrown to them. At the end of  the 
experiment we fully debriefed the participants. 
We explained that they had not played with 
other participants but with preprogrammed 
computer players. 
Results
Manipulation checks The manipulations 
appeared to be successful. The check on game 
type yielded only a main effect of  game type, 
F(1, 83) = 260.82, p < .001, η2 = .76. Participants 
indicated that it was more dangerous to participate 
in the bomb game (M = 5.89, SD = 1.60) than in 
the ball game (M = 1.44, SD = .79). The check on 
game experience yielded only a main effect of  
ostracism, F(1, 83) = 253.07, p < .001, η2 = .75. 
Included participants (M = 32.75%, SD = 10.74) 
reported to have caught more bombs/balls than 
ostracized participants (M = 5.25%, SD = 3.54).
Reflexive responses We predicted that Cyber-
bomb would mitigate reflexive responses to 
ostracism. This prediction was supported by the 
data of  both need satisfaction and mood (see 
Table 1).1
The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the need satisfaction 
yielded a main effect of  game experience, F(1, 83) 
= 122.06, p < .001, η2 = .60 a main effect of
game type, F(1, 83) = 14.24, p < .001, η2 = .15, 
and the predicted interaction of  game experience 
and game type, F(1, 83) = 4.09, p < .046, η2 = .05. 
Simple main effect tests comparing ostracism and 
inclusion showed that need satisfaction was low-
ered more by ostracism in Cyberball, F(1, 83) = 
83.30, p < .001, η2 = .50, than in Cyberbomb,
F(1, 83) = 41.22, p < .001, η2 = .32. Moreover, 
simple main effect tests comparing Cyberbomb 
and Cyberball showed that Cyberball lowered 
need satisfaction in the ostracism condition, F(1, 83) 
= 15.15, p < .001, η2 = .15, but not in the inclusion 
condition, F(1, 83) = 1.55, ns. 
Figure 1. Virtual Cyberball players were shown to be 
throwing either a ball (left) or a bomb (right).
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The 2 × 2 ANOVA on our mood scale yielded 
also a main effect of  game experience, F(1, 83) = 
37.00, p = .001, η2 = .31, a main effect of  game type, 
F(1, 83) = 4.49, p < .05, η2 = .05, and the predicted 
interaction of  game experience and game type, F(1, 
83) = 5.24, p < .05, η2 = .059. Simple main effect 
tests comparing ostracism and inclusion showed 
that mood was more negatively affected by ostra-
cism in Cyberball, F(1, 83) = 34.24, p < .001, η2 = 
.30, than in Cyberbomb, F(1, 83) = 7.29, p < .01, η2 
= .08. Moreover, simple main effect tests comparing 
Cyberball and Cyberbomb showed that Cyberball 
lowered mood in the ostracism condition, F(1, 83) 
= 8.99, p < .01, η2 = .15, but not in the inclusion 
condition, F(1, 83) = .01, ns. 
Discussion
Study 1 showed that reflexive responses to ostra-
cism are moderated by whether the game is depicted 
as a ball toss or bomb toss. As predicted, partici-
pants were hurt less by ostracism in a game of  
bomb toss than in a game of  ball toss. This finding 
adds to the literature in several important ways. 
Speaking to the intimate relation between belonging 
and survival that is central in theories on ostracism 
and exclusion, we show that merely adding a fuse to 
a ball is enough to succeed where others have failed. 
Apparently, the inability to find moderation in previ-
ous ostracism studies may be because the factors 
investigated were too “high-level” requiring a more 
thorough cognitive appraisal. Finally, the fact that 
we used identical reflexive measures as previous 
research increases confidence that the inability to 
find moderation in previous research cannot be 
attributed to weak or different dependent variables. 
This provides further support that such self-
reported need satisfaction and mood that are 
directly assessed after the ostracism episode are 
indeed a good proxy of  social pain (Eisenberger 
et al., 2003; Williams, 2009). 
Study 2: Aggressive behavior in 
Cyberbomb
In Study 2 we extended our analyses in several direc-
tions. One extension was to assess how ostracism 
relates to another situation in which people are 
singled out. For this purpose we expanded our 
experimental design by introducing an over-inclusion 
condition (cf. Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Williams 
et al., 2000). This over-inclusion condition allowed 
us to test whether people respond differently when 
they stand out by not getting any attention (ostra-
cism condition) compared to when they stand out 
by being in the center of  attention (over-inclusion 
condition). One benefit of  this extra condition is 
that it addresses the potential alternative explanation 
that ostracism effects are not driven by the fact that 
people are ostracized but driven by the fact that peo-
ple stand out. A related benefit is that is underscores 
that being singled out is a relative experience. After 
all, our manipulation of  game type did not moder-
ate need satisfaction or mood when participants are 
equally included. The more important benefit is that 
it allowed us to compare ostracism and over-inclu-
sion in Cyberbomb. That is, how people respond to 
two negative situations.
Typically, in the few instances in which over-
inclusion has been used (Van Beest & Williams, 
2006; Williams et al., 2000) people respond more 
positively when over-included in a positive situa-
tion than when included in a positive situation. 
Moreover, people respond more negatively when 
over-included in a negative situation than when 
included in a negative situation (Van Beest & 
Williams, 2006). However, Van Beest and Williams 
also showed that people felt more distressed 
when ostracized from a financially threatening 
situation than when over-included in such a 
financially threatening situation. Apparently, and 
consistent with theories on belonging (Baumeister 
& Leary, 2005), sociometer theory, and ostracism 
(Williams, 2009), humans derive value from being 
the center of  attention even when the valence of  
this attention is rather negative. In similar vein, 
we hypothesized that being over-included in 
Cyberbomb would be perceived as a negative 
experience compared to being equally included in 
Cyberbomb, but perhaps less negative compared 
to being ostracized in Cyberbomb.
The second extension of  Study 2 was to assess 
how people respond to ostracism when they 
have had more time to form a thorough appraisal of  
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the situation. In addition to the reflexive responses 
that we assessed in Study 1 we now also assessed 
reflective responses. To extend research on the link 
between exclusion and aggression (see also, Ayduk, 
Gyurak, & Luerssen, 2008; Chow et al., 2008; Leary, 
Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003; Twenge, Bau-
meister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; Twenge, 
Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Warburton et al., 
2006), we set out to analyse whether, or more spe-
cifically under which conditions, the reduced dis-
tress of  ostracism in Cyberbomb would be still be 
powerful enough to evoke retaliation. 
For this purpose is should be recalled that we 
argue that Cyberbomb is a setting that could be 
perceived as a threat to survival. One operational 
consequence of  this assumption is that death 
thoughts ought to be more accessible in a Cyber-
bomb setting than in a Cyberball setting. To test 
this assumption we conducted a classroom exer-
cise in a large Midwestern university in the USA 
(28 men; 24 women; Mean age 22.10 years, SD = 
0.87). In the exercise participants were instructed 
to read the cover story that we used in Study 1 to 
introduce either Cyberbomb or Cyberball. The 
accessibility of  death thoughts was measured by a 
word-fragment completion task that has success-
fully been used by others (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszc-
zynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Schimel, 
Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007). Participants were 
presented with 20 word fragments of  which six 
could be completed in a death or nondeath related 
way. For example, one of  the fragments consisted 
of  the letters COFF_ _ and could be completed as 
COFFIN or as COFFEE. The other possible 
death-related words were killed, buried, death, skull 
and grave. Supporting our assumption that Cyber-
bomb can be perceived as a survival threat, death 
thoughts were more accessible when participants 
read the cover story of  Cyberbomb (M = 1.09, SD 
= 0.86) than the cover story of  Cyberball (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.53), F (1, 48) = 6.99, p < .01, η2 = .10. 
The more important operational consequence 
is that one should thus be able to increase or 
decrease the impact of  Cyberbomb on retaliation 
when people are able to ponder the consequences 
of  dying. For this purpose we turned to Dechesne 
and colleagues (2003) who introduced an intriguing 
afterlife manipulation. They argued that the assur-
ance of  an afterlife should lessen the cognitive 
appraisal of  death’s negative consequences whereas 
the denial of  an afterlife should increase the cogni-
tive appraisal of  death’s negative consequences. 
Taking a slightly different interpretation, we 
assumed that the assurance of  an afterlife conveys 
a sense of  belonging because it conveys the prom-
ise that one will be permanently reunited with one’s 
family, friends and other loved ones. Provided that 
such a promise of  belonging reduces aggression, 
we thus argued that the assurance of  an afterlife 
would reduce aggression, especially when actual 
belonging needs are most thwarted. Hence, we 
argued that assuring individuals of  the existence of  
an afterlife should have a more positive impact in 
the ostracism condition in which people are com-
pletely deprived of  attention than in the inclusion 
and over-inclusion condition in which individuals 
are still worthy of  attention by their fellow game 
players. We thus expected that the assurance of  an 
afterlife would reduce aggression towards fellow 
game players in the ostracism condition, but not––
or at least to a lesser degree––in the inclusion and 
over-inclusion conditions. Crucial in this hypothe-
sis is of  course our underlying assumption that 
Cyberbomb is related to death whereas Cyberball is 
not. Hence, we are not saying that the assurance of  
an afterlife will reduce aggression regardless of  
whether people are ostracized from Cyberbomb or 
Cyberball. Our hypothesis is more specific: We 
hypothesize that the assurance of  an afterlife 
should especially reduce retaliation when death is 
salient and thus in Cyberbomb. 
Method
Participants and design Participants were 183 
students from Leiden University (146 women; 
Mean age = 20.95, SD = 2.40) and randomly 
assigned to a 2 (game type: cyberball, cyberbomb) 
x 3 (game experience: ostracized, included, over-
included) x 2 (afterlife: yes, no) full factorial design. 
Procedure Study 2 contained three distinct 
phases that were presented as unrelated studies. 
In the first phase we introduced our manipulation 
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of  afterlife. Following Dechesne et al. (2003), 
participants were informed that they would par-
ticipate in a study about text recall. In the afterlife 
conditions, participants read a bogus scientific 
article stating that leading medical investigators 
found considerable evidence of  the probability 
of  a continued existence after physical death. In 
the no afterlife conditions, the article informed 
participants that near death experiences can be 
readily explained by physiological and psycho-
logical processes. 
In the second phase we introduced the 
game type and game experience manipulations. 
Depending on condition participants were either 
ostracized or included, or over-included in a 
bomb or ball tossing game. Again there were 30 
tosses. In the over-inclusion condition both com-
puter players only threw the bomb/ball to the 
participant. In the inclusion condition the com-
puter players ensured that each player of  the 
game got an equal number of  bomb/ball tosses. 
In the ostracism condition each computer player 
threw the bomb/ball only once to the participant. 
As in Study 1, we ensured that the game ended 
when the players were not holding the bomb/
ball. After the game, participants filled out the 
need satisfaction index (α = .92), the mood index 
(α = .85), and the manipulation checks of  game 
experience, game type, and afterlife. The manipu-
lation check of  game type and game experience 
were identical to the previous study. The manipu-
lation check of  afterlife consisted of  two ques-
tions (There is life after dead; Death is only the 
physical ending of  one’s existence, α = .70). 
In the third phase we introduced our measure 
of  aggression. Using an adaptation the Lieber-
man, Solomon, Greenberg, and McGreggor 
(1999) procedure, aggression was measured as the 
amount of  hot sauce participants allocated to one 
of  the other players (see also Warburton et al., 
2006). In essence, in line with a cover story of  
sensory perception, participants were led to 
believe that they would either taste or deliver 
(rigged so that they would always deliver) a food 
substance (rigged to always be hot sauce), and that 
the other individual’s taste preferences would be 
known to them (rigged so that the other person 
always indicated they hated hot spicy food). The 
point of  this paradigm is to ensure that partici-
pants know that the more hot sauce they deliver, 
the more they are hurting another person. It was 
made clear that the other person was one the fel-
low players of  Cyberball/Cyberbomb. Hence, our 
measure of  hot sauce allocation should not be 
seen as a measure of  displaced aggression. Instead, 
it is a measure of  retaliation. After participants 
prepared a taste sample they were fully debriefed. 
Participants were thanked and paid 5 euros for 
their participation. 
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks All manipulations 
appeared to be successful. A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on 
the manipulation check of  game experience 
yielded only a main effect of  game experience, 
F(2, 171) = 435.81, p < .001, η2 = .84. The over-
included participants (M = 75.78 %, SD = 19.72) 
reported to have caught more bombs than the 
included participants (M = 34.39 %, SD = 9.38) 
who in turn reported to have caught more bombs 
than the ostracized participants (M = 6.23 %, SD 
= 5.09). Tukey’s HSD tests showed that all these 
means were statistically different. A 3 × 2 × 2 
ANOVA on the manipulation check of  game type 
yielded only a main effect of  game type, F(1, 171) 
= 291.97, p < .001, η2 = .63. Participants indicated 
that it was more dangerous to participate in the 
bomb game (M = 5.70, SD = 1.68) than in the ball 
game (M = 1.91, SD = 1.20). A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA 
on the manipulation check of  afterlife yielded 
only a main effect of  our afterlife manipulation, 
F  (1, 171) = 6.57, p < .01, η2 = .04. Participants in 
the afterlife conditions (M = 4.79, SD = 1.73) 
believed more in the existence of  an afterlife than 
in the no afterlife conditions (M = 4.1, SD = 1.73). 
Reflexive responses See Table 2 for means 
and standard deviations of  the reflexive responses 
to ostracism.2 The 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on our need 
satisfaction scale yielded a main effect of  game 
experience, F(2, 171) = 89.96, p < .001, η2 = .53, 
and the predicted interaction effect of  game 
experience and game type, F(1, 171) = 8.83,
 at Universiteit van Tilburg on February 3, 2011gpi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Beest et al. 9
Table 3. Means and standard deviations (within 
brackets) of  hot sauce in grams by game experience 
(ostracism, inclusion, over-inclusion), afterlife 
(afterlife, no afterlife) and game type (Cyberball, 
Cyberbomb) in Study 2
Ostracism Inclusion Over-inclusion
Cyberbomb
 Afterlife 12.35 (5.71) 12.86 (3.80) 16.56 (11.11)
 No afterlife 24.14 (16.31) 11.20 (2.33) 18.78 (15.32)
Cyberball
 Afterlife 19.42 (15.35) 12.81 (5.57) 11.72 (2.63)
 No afterlife 15.49 (8.01) 12.42 (2.39) 11.97 (2.68)
Table 2. Means and standard deviations (within 
brackets) of  reflexive responses by game experience 
(ostracism, inclusion, over-inclusion), afterlife (afterlife, 
no afterlife) and game type (Cyberball, Cyberbomb) in 
Study 2
 Ostracism Inclusion Over-inclusion
Cyberbomb
 Afterlife
  Needs 3.31 (1.05) 5.20 (.84) 4.63 (1.09)
  Mood 4.58 (1.75) 5.03 (.85) 4.70 1.39
 No afterlife
  Needs 2.95 (.77) 5.04 (.86) 4.46 (.78)
  Mood 4.61 (1.29) 5.29 (.79) 4.88 (1.03)
Cyberball 
 Afterlife
  Needs 2.19 (.46) 5.10 (.95) 5.21 (1.46)
  Mood 3.84 (1.15) 5.31 (.99) 5.06 (1.50)
 No afterlife
  Needs 2.54 (.98) 4.75 (1.31) 5.13 (1.34)
  Mood 4.20 (.87) 5.15 (.82) 5.33 (1.19)
Note: Assessment of  needs and mood were made on 7-point 
scales.
p < .001, η2 = .09. Simple main effect tests compar-
ing Cyberbomb and Cyberball showed that Cyber-
bomb increased need satisfaction in the ostracism 
condition (Mbomb = 3.21, SD = 0.99; Mball = 2.36; 
SD = 0.77), F(1, 171) = 10.92, p < .001, η2 = .06, 
decreased need satisfaction in the over-inclusion 
condition (Mbomb = 4.46, SD = 0.95; Mball = 5.16; 
SD = 1.38), F(1, 171) = 4.48, p < .05, η2 = .02, 
and did not alter need satisfaction in the inclusion 
condition (Mbomb = 5.05, SD = 0.77; Mball = 4.91; 
SD = 1.14), F(1, 171) = 1.92, ns. Simple mains 
effect tests and subsequent Tukey HSD compari-
sons of  game experience showed that the ostra-
cism, inclusion and over-inclusion conditions 
differed in both Cyberbomb, F(1, 171) = 28.05 ,
p < .001, η2 = .24, and Cyberball, F(1, 171) = 
70.12, p < .001, η2 = .45. 
The 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on mood yielded a main 
effect of  game experience, F(2, 171) = 9.53, p < 
.001, η2 = .10, and a marginal interaction effect of  
game experience and game type, F(1, 171) = 2.78, 
p = .06, η2 = .09. Simple main effect tests compar-
ing Cyberbomb and Cyberball showed that Cyber-
bomb increased mood in the ostracism condition 
(Mbomb = 4.60; SD = 0.21; Mball = 4.02, SD = 0.19), 
F(1, 171) = 3.85, p = .05, η2 = .02, but not the 
inclusion (Mbomb = 5.17; SD = 0.21; Mball = 5.23, 
SD = 0.22), F(1, 171) = .04, p = .85, η2 = .00, or 
over-inclusion condition (Mbomb = 4.78; SD = 0.21; 
Mball = 5.19, SD = 0.21), F(1, 171) = 1.43, p =.22, 
η2 = .01. Moreover, the game experience manipu-
lation moderated mood in Cyberball, F(1, 171) = 
10.19, p < .001, η2 = .10, but not Cyberbomb,
F(1, 171) = 2.04, p = .13, η2 = .02. Specific Tukey’s 
HSD comparisons in Cyberball showed that the 
mean of  ostracism differed from the mean of  
inclusion and over-inclusion.
The overall picture of  our analysis of  the 
reflexive responses replicates our findings of  
Study 1. We again observe that ostracism is a 
painful experience compared to inclusion that is 
mitigated in Cyberbomb. What the current analy-
sis adds is that being over-included in Cyberbomb 
is also a painful experience. And, if  we consider 
need satisfaction, that ostracism from a Cyber-
bomb is more painful than being over-included in 
Cyberbomb. Finally, consistent with the ostra-
cism model discussed in the introduction of  the 
current paper (Williams, 2009), these findings 
were not qualified by the afterlife manipulation, a 
factor which we belief  requires elaboration and 
higher levels of  cognitive processing, and thus 
more likely to affect reflective responses. 
Reflective response The means and standard 
deviations of  the hot sauce allocation are given in 
Table 3. However, we performed a log transfor-
mation on hot sauce allocation because these data 
were skewed. The log sauce data that was anal-
ysed is depicted in Figure 2.
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A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on log-transformed hot 
sauce allocation yielded a main effect of  game 
experience, F(1, 171) = 4.78, p < .01, η2 = .05, and 
the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 171) = 
3.86, p < .05, η2 = .04. To interpret this interaction 
we focused specifically on either the Cyberball or 
Cyberbomb conditions.
A 3 × 2 ANOVA on log-transformed hot 
sauce in Cyberball yielded only a main effect of  
game experience, F(2, 78) = 3.82, p < .05, η2 = 
.08. Tukey’s HSD tests showed that participants 
allocated more hot sauce to fellow game players 
when ostracized (M = 1.17, SD = 0.22) than 
when included (M = 1.08, SD = 0.10), or over-
included, (M = 1.06, SD = 0.08).
A 3 × 2 ANOVA on log-transformed hot 
sauce allocation yielded a main effect of  game 
experience, F(2, 93) = 3.57, p < .05, η2 = .05.
Tukey’s HSD tests showed that participants allo-
cated more hot sauce to fellow game players 
when ostracized (M = 1.17, SD = 0.24) or over-
included (M = 1.17, SD = 0.22), than when 
included (M = 1.06, SD = 0.10). This shows that 
being ostracized from a negative situation and 
being over-included in a negative situation may 
cause people to retaliate. The analysis yielded also 
an interaction effect between game experience 
and afterlife, F(2, 93) = 4.68, p < .01, η2 = .09. 
Simple main effect tests comparing the two 
after life conditions revealed that the assurance 
of  an afterlife lowered hot sauce allocation in the 
ostracism condition, F(1, 93) = 10.81, p < .001,
η2 = .12, but not in the inclusion or over-inclusion 
condition (both Fs < 1). Alternatively, simple 
main effect tests of  the game experience effect 
revealed that this manipulation did not affect hot 
sauce allocation when participants were assured 
of  the existence of  an afterlife, F(2, 93) = 1.22,
p = .31, η2 = .02. However, it did affect hot sauce 
allocation when participants were told that there 
is no scientific proof  for the existence of  an 
afterlife, F(2, 93) = 6.89, p < .01, η2 = .12. Subse-
quent Tukey’s HSD tests in these no afterlife 
conditions, showed that ostracized participants 
allocated more hot sauce than included individu-
als. The other Tukey’s HSD comparisons were 
not significant. 
In sum, the above analyses show that people 
may retaliate when ostracized and when over-
included in Cyberbomb, but that the assurance of  
an afterlife reduces such aggression only in the 
ostracism condition. This is consistent with our 
Figure 2. Chart of  hot sauce allocation after log transformation. Capped vertical bars denote 1 standard error.
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hypothesis that the assurance of  an afterlife 
would reduce the negative impact of  ostracism in 
Cyberbomb and not––or at least to a lesser 
degree––in the inclusion and over-inclusion con-
ditions. Moreover, the fact that our afterlife 
manipulation did not moderate behavior in 
Cyberball is consistent with our proposition that 
Cyberbomb is related to death whereas Cyberball 
is not. In Cyberball participant retaliated only 
when ostracized and regardless of  the assurance 
or denial of  an afterlife.
General discussion
In a series of  studies we examined how people 
react to being included or ostracized from a game 
of  bomb toss. Consistent with previous research 
in which participants were ostracized by despised 
outgroup members (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 
2007; Smith & Williams, 2004; Williams et al., 
2000), computers (Zadro et al., 2004), or from 
a financially harmful situation (Van Beest & 
Williams, 2006), we observed that participants were 
hurt when ostracized from a game of  bomb-toss. 
However, for the first time in this search of  how 
low must one go to test the power of  ostracism 
we finally observed that this experience was less 
painful than being excluded from a game of  ball-
toss. As predicted, it suffices to make death 
salient by having participant play a virtual game 
of  bomb toss to make ostracism from such a situ-
ation less painful. 
Results also showed that participants were 
aggressive towards fellow game players when 
ostracized from Cyberbomb. This finding sug-
gests that the reduced distress that was observed 
on the reflexive reactions after ostracism from a 
death game is still powerful enough to evoke 
aggression. More relevant, is that such aggressive 
responses are moderated by scientific evidence in 
favor or against the existence of  an afterlife. Par-
ticipants who were ostracized from Cyberbomb 
only retaliated when they were provided evidence 
against the existence of  an afterlife. They did not 
retaliate when they were assured of  the existence 
of  an afterlife. This is consistent with our sugges-
tion that an afterlife provides a future sense of  
belonging that reduces aggressive behavior. 
Moreover, the fact that this reduction was only 
observed in Cyberbomb and not in Cyberball is 
consistent with our reasoning that Cyberbomb is 
more related to survival than Cyberball. 
On a more general level our findings contrib-
ute to Williams’s model of  ostracism (Williams, 
2009). According to this model it is important to 
make a temporal distinction between responses 
that assess the immediate experience of  ostra-
cism (i.e., reflexive responses) and more delayed 
coping or goal directed behaviors (i.e., reflective 
responses) because people are more likely to dis-
regard mitigating information during or directly 
after being ostracized than when people have 
time to form a cognitive appraisal of  the situa-
tion. Consistent with this difference we found 
that providing participants with scientific evi-
dence in favor of  or against the existence of  an 
afterlife did not affect self-reports of  needs or 
mood that assessed the experience of  being 
ostracized. Instead, the afterlife manipulation 
only affected our measure of  retaliation which 
was assessed when considerable time had passed 
and which we assume is based on more thorough 
evaluation of  all the aspects that are relevant to 
understand a situation. Indeed, the fact that the 
afterlife manipulation only affected reflective 
behavior in Cyberbomb and not Cyberball 
extends prior research on cross-cutting variables 
and reflective behavior with the notion that such 
cross-cutting variables need to be relevant to 
form an appraisal of  the situation. 
A linear function of  inclusionary status?
Introducing an over-inclusion condition allowed 
the possibility to compare two different situations 
in which people stand out. In the ostracism con-
dition individuals stand out because they do not 
get any attention. They receive less attention than 
expected. In the over-inclusion condition indi-
viduals stand out because they receive more 
attention than expected. This allowed us to assess 
whether the experience of  ostracism can be 
viewed as a continuum that ranges from ostra-
cism, through inclusion, to over-inclusion (see 
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also Leary, 1990). Replicating the work of  Van 
Beest and Williams (2006) we again observed a 
difference between these two ends of  the inclu-
sionary status continuum. Reflexive and reflective 
responses were not congruent when people were 
ostracized. However, they were congruent when 
people were over-included. This is consistent 
with Leary’s (2005) assertion that conceptualizing 
rejection as an index of  inclusionary status rang-
ing from maximal exclusion to maximal inclusion 
may be useful for capturing the effort people use 
to reject others, but it may not be useful in 
accounting how victims of  rejection respond to 
rejection.
More important is that our Cyberbomb para-
digm also allowed us to compare how (a) people 
respond when ostracized and (b) how people 
respond when over-included in a negative situa-
tion. To the extent that over-inclusion in a nega-
tive situation can be viewed as a form of  punitive 
attention, it may thus be argued that this allowed 
us to compare two forms of  rejection: ostracism 
and bullying (Van Beest & Williams, 2006; Zadro, 
Williams, & Richardson, 2005). The current find-
ings show that both these forms of  rejection are 
perceived as painful and that both these forms of  
rejection may infuse aggression. This corrobo-
rates the suggestion that both ostracism and bul-
lying are possible antecedents of  aggressive 
behavior (Junoven & Gross, 2005). For example, 
studies of  the infamous school shootings in the 
United States reveal that many of  the adolescent 
who hurt and killed their fellow schoolmates 
were allegedly rejected and bullied by their peers 
(Leary et al., 2003). 
Limitations and further research
We used self-reports of  fundamental needs and 
mood to assess how people experience ostracism. 
Similar to previous research on ostracism we 
combined belonging, self-esteem, control, and 
meaning in one overall need satisfaction measure, 
and various emotions in one measure of  mood. 
We provided these separate analyses because this 
allows a more careful comparison with previous 
research on ostracism where these constructs are 
analysed in a similar fashion. We realize that these 
measures are correlated and that they are only a 
proxy of  whether participants are truly hurt. We 
take comfort from the fact that research has 
shown that such responses are highly correlated 
with brain activity in the dACC––a structure that 
is also know to be active when people are physi-
cally hurt (Eisenberger et al., 2003). Future 
research may also investigate such brain activity 
during Cyberbomb. We expect that the unique 
survival threat that is afforded by Cyberbomb 
may also moderate dACC activity when partici-
pants are ostracized. Moreover, it may be noted 
that we measured reflexive reactions with self-
reported fundamental needs and mood whereas 
we measured reflective reactions with a behav-
ioral retaliation measure. However, we are not 
arguing that retaliation cannot be reflexive or that 
self-reported needs and mood cannot be reflec-
tive. After all, prior research on aggression has 
repeatedly shown that aggressive acts may occur 
without much deliberation or thought (Berkowitz, 
1990; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). The 
point is that we measured the need-satisfaction 
and mood measures first and retaliation second. 
Further research may pursue a research agenda in 
which one varies the order of  dependent vari-
ables and also consider more closely how much 
time needs to pass to alter a reflexive response 
into a more reflective response.
We also acknowledge that retaliation or 
aggression is but one example of  coping behav-
ior to ostracism. Indeed, several researchers have 
shown that people use other coping mechanisms. 
For example, researchers have now shown that 
ostracism increases social attention (Pickett & 
Gardner, 2005), attempts to reconnect (Maner, 
DeWall, & Baumeister, 2007), good citizenship 
(Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Galluci, & van Lange, 2005), 
unconscious mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005), 
collective effort (Williams & Sommer, 1997), 
conformity (Williams et al., 2000), and compli-
ance (Carter-Sowell, Chen, & Williams, 2008). 
Moreover, Williams’ ostracism model argues that 
antisocial coping responses are associated with 
control and meaning whereas prosocial responses 
are associated with belonging and self-esteem. 
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This would imply that our retaliation measure 
should replenish control and meaning more than 
belonging and self-esteem. However, because we 
did not include such measures after the retaliation 
measure we cannot affirm whether this was also 
the case in the current study. To also focus on 
these other types of  coping behavior and associ-
ated needs was beyond the scope of  the current 
article. We showed that cross-cutting variables 
that are relevant to evaluate the implications of  a 
situation may mitigate antisocial responses to 
ostracism. We assume that a similar pattern would 
emerge when testing more prosocial responses 
and that such responses are indeed associated 
with recovery of  specific needs.
Cyberbomb and terror management
We set out to test a model of  ostracism but real-
ize that our results can be compared with 
research on terror management. From research 
on terror management we know that people 
defend their worldview when mortality is salient 
(Greenberg et al., 1997), and even punish those 
that threaten their worldview (McGreggor et al., 
1998). Moreover, research on terror manage-
ment has shown that mortality salience increases 
need for affiliation (Wisman & Koole, 2003) and 
that the belief  in an afterlife reduces the effect 
of  mortality salience (Dechesne et al., 2003). 
Consistent with this reasoning we observed that 
aggressive reactions in Cyberbomb are reduced 
when people are provided evidence in favor of  
the existence of  an afterlife. Moreover, consis-
tent with terror management we observed that 
death thoughts are more accessible in Cyber-
bomb than in Cyberball. However, we are not 
sure whether terror management would also pre-
dict that people are less hurt by ostracism from 
Cyberbomb than by ostracism from Cyberball. 
Or that people are more hurt when over-included 
in Cyberbomb than when over-included in 
Cyberball. After all, provided that terror manage-
ment increases need for affiliation, one could 
also argue that people should be more hurt by 
ostracism (and enjoy being over-included) when 
death is made salient than when death is not 
made salient. In sum, we believe that our con-
ceptualization of  Cyberbomb as an easy recog-
nizable threat provides the most parsimonious 
explanation. This conceptualization of  Cyber-
bomb fits the data that people do not enjoy being 
over-included, but do enjoy being ostracized. 
Under which conditions Cyberbomb is or is not 
akin to a standard mortality salience manipula-
tion such as telling people to consider what 
would happen to them when they physically die 
is an interesting line of  further research.
At this point is also relevant to reiterate that 
Cyberbomb is thus more than simply an aversive 
stimulus from which ostracism provides an 
escape. The unique aspect of  Cyberbomb that 
sets it apart from previous aversive situations that 
have been studied––for example––losing money 
(Van Beest & Williams, 2006) or despised out-
group members (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 
2007)––is that Cyberbomb is related to survival. 
Put differently, we believe that previous research 
failed to moderate the immediate experience of  
ostracism because the cross-cutting variable 
requires more elaborate cognitive processing than 
cues that are more directly related to survival. 
Moreover, we do not believe that our effects are 
driven by attributions of  benevolence. That is, we 
do not believe that our participants are less hurt 
by ostracism because they inferred that the others 
must like them. After all, if  such an interpretation 
is valid, one would also expect that being ostra-
cized from a financially costly situation would 
lessen the impact of  ostracism. Then again, we 
did not assess attributions of  benevolence. Nor, 
did we directly compare various aversive situa-
tions. We only focused on Cyberbomb and 
Cyberball. Future research may integrate research 
on financial threats and survival threats. We 
would predict that only the survival threat will 
mitigate the experience of  ostracism.
Finally, it should be noted that our manipula-
tion of  game type moderated only the situations 
in which participants stand out. Whether players 
tossed around a ball or a bomb affected the 
ostracism condition and the over-inclusion con-
dition, but not the inclusion condition. This 
draws attention to the fact that the inclusion 
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condition that is often used in ostracism research 
is a very specific form of  inclusion that is char-
acterized by the fact that people are equally 
included. The more important conclusion is that 
the positive and negative aspects of  a situation 
are apparently assessed in relative terms. Only 
when people stand out they process whether or 
not the stand out in a positive or negative way, 
a line of  thought that is also central in recent 
research on partial ostracism (Jones, Carter-
Sowell, Kelly, & Williams, 2009).
To conclude
As we try to understand the plight of  individu-
als who are habitually ostracized because of  
their status, group membership, or other distin-
guishing characteristics, we need to examine 
both reflexive reactions that might result in 
unthinking or automatic responses, and reflec-
tive reactions that employ personal disposi-
tions, externally-provided information, and 
situational constraints that result in anti-social 
(and, with further research, possibly pro-social) 
strategies, goals, and behaviors. We showed that 
a symbolic survival threat mitigated how people 
experience ostracism and that the assurance 
that life does not end at death reduced aggres-
sion against fellow game players. These results 
speak to the intimate relation between ostra-
cism and survival that has been proposed in 
theories of  belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995), rejection (Leary, 2001) and ostracism 
(Williams, 2009).
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1  Need-satisfaction and mood were correlated (r = .77) 
and an analysis in which need-satisfaction and mood 
are integrated in an overall measure of  distress 
yielded a similar picture as the separate analysis of  
need satisfaction and mood.
2  Need-satisfaction and mood were correlated 
(r = .66) and an analysis in which need-satisfaction 
and mood are integrated in an overall measure of  
distress yielded a similar picture as the separate 
analysis of  need satisfaction and mood.
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